| Summary |
| Email title: |
'Westpac Bank users warning' |
| Scam target: |
Westpac customers |
| Email format: |
A HTML email |
| Sender: |
Westpac <users-billing5@westpac.com.au>
|
| Sender spoofed? |
Yes |
| Scam call to action: |
"We regret to acknowledge, that some data on
users accounts could be lost. The administration kindly
asks you to follow the reference given below..." |
| Scam goal: |
Getting victim's Westpac website user number and
password |
| Call to action format: |
URL link |
| Visible link: |
https://oIb.westpac.com.au/ib/defauIt.asp |
| Called link : |
http://olb.westpac.com.au%2E%75%73%65%72%...
|
| Link decodes to: |
http://olb.westpac.com.au.userdll.com:4903/ib/index.htm |
| Resolved site: |
http://olb.westpac.com.au.userdll.com:4903/ib/index.htm,
and http://www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBOB+Terms+and+Conditions |
|
| |
| E-mail |
This is another representative of the latest and most
dangerous phishing scheme. It also introduces a couple
of new tricks. The first one is that the URL you see is
not only spoofed, but the phishers have used a different
font to display some of the letters in it. This way they
can change the 'l' to a 'I' without the victim noticing.
It is also used to try to counter the anti-spam filters.
The email itself looks very decent. It is simple and
well designed - exactly what you expect from a financial
institution. It's motivation is somewhat dubious, but
everything else is fine - the sender, the logo and the
link look exactly Westpac.
|
_email.jpg)
|
| |
| Web Site |
| Visible link: |
https://oIb.westpac.com.au/ib/defauIt.asp |
| Called link : |
http://olb.westpac.com.au%2E%75%73%65%72%...
|
| Link decodes to: |
http://olb.westpac.com.au.userdll.com:4903/ib/index.htm |
| Resolved site: |
http://olb.westpac.com.au.userdll.com:4903/ib/index.htm,
and http://www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBOB+Terms+and+Conditions |
|
And here is another new trick - even if you check the
source code of the HTML message for the real link, you
will see a URL that starts with 'olb.westpac.au'. The rest
of the URL is encoded. This alone is enough to fool most
of the internet users. But even if you decode the rest
of the URL (there is a free, web-based decoder at http://www.wight.info/iwindex/hexform.htm)
the resulting link looks pretty nice.
When the victim clicks the link, a pop-up window opens
- an exact replica of the Westpac sign in page. However,
no URL is displayed. The victim would never realize that
this is not the real Westpac sign in.
|
_site1.jpg) |
| |
At the same time, another site opens. This is the official
Westpac "Terms and conditions" page.
|
| |
_site2.jpg) |
Notice that this time the page is opened in a normal
window, not a pop-up. This is done to make you see the
original URL and page, and make an association between
it and the pop-up with the fake sign in. And it works
- the victim sees two pages with the same design and
no fake URL. This makes this phish a very, very dangerous
one.
The only clue of phishing you can instantly have, is
that the link in the message points to a secure site
(it starts with 'https'), and no secure site opens.
|